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Das et al. / FEAR AND PERSUASIVE MESSAGES
Fear Appeals Motivate Acceptance of Action
Recommendations: Evidence for a Positive Bias
in the Processing of Persuasive Messages
Enny H. H. J. Das
Free University, Amsterdam
John B. F. de Wit
Wolfgang Stroebe
Utrecht University
Three experiments are reported that tested the hypothesis that the
use of fear appeals in health persuasion may lead to positively
biased systematic processing of a subsequent action recommen-
dation aimed at reducing the health threat and, consequently, to
more persuasion, regardless of the quality of the arguments in the
recommendation. The levels of participants’ vulnerability to as
well as the severity of a health risk were varied independently, fol-
lowed by a manipulation of the quality of the arguments in the
subsequent action recommendation. The dependent variables
included measures of persuasion (attitude, intention, and
action), negative affect, and cognitive responses. The results
show that participants who felt vulnerable to the health threat
were more persuaded, experienced more negative emotions, and
had more favorable cognitive responses. Both negative emotions
concerning one’s vulnerability and positive thoughts concern-
ing the recommendation mediated the effects of vulnerability on
persuasion.
Keywords: fear appeal; vulnerability; severity; behavior change; per-
suasion; biased processing
Fear appeals have long been used in health education
to motivate people to adopt healthy lifestyles. Extensive
research conducted on the effectiveness of fear appeals
in changing attitudes and behavior between 1950 and
1970 resulted in a complex body of often inconsistent
findings (see Leventhal, 1970). This article will present a
stage theory of the processing of fear-arousing commu-
nications, which will reconcile some major inconsisten-
cies in the patterns of findings reported in this literature.
We will also present three experiments designed to test
central predictions from our model.
Early Theoretical Perspectives
Early research on fear arousal has been guided theo-
retically by the assumption that fear is a learned drive
and that protective recommendations will be accepted if
they are effective in reducing fear (e.g., Hovland, Janis,
& Kelley, 1953). Because part of the empirical evidence
was inconsistent with this drive model, Leventhal (1970)
developed the parallel response model. This introduced
threat appraisal as the mediator between environmental
threat and action and abandoned the notion that emo-
tional arousal is a necessary antecedent of the adaptation
to danger. A weakness of the model is that it does not
specify the processes of cognitive evaluation that pre-
cede the action tendencies. This task was completed by
later models that focused exclusively on cognitive pro-
cesses, namely, the health belief model (e.g.,
Rosenstock, 1974) and protection motivation theory
(e.g., Rogers & Mewborn, 1976). Despite fundamental
differences in their assumptions about underlying pro-
cesses, all of these models predict that individuals are
more likely to accept a recommendation the greater the
threat, but only if the recommendation is seen as an
effective way to reduce the threat. Protective actions that
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are perceived as ineffective in averting the negative con-
sequences will not be adopted.
The empirical evidence is only partly consistent with
these predictions. Although the vast majority of experi-
ments have found that higher levels of threat lead to
greater persuasion (Sutton, 1982), manipulation of the
effectiveness of the recommended action resulted only
in main effects (e.g., Chu, 1966; Maddux & Rogers,
1983) rather than the predicted interaction between
threat and effectiveness (see Eagly & Chaiken, 1993;
Rogers & Prentice-Dunn, 1997). Particularly damaging
have been findings revealing that increases in the sever-
ity of a threat had less impact on those who felt vulnera-
ble than on those who did not (e.g., Berkowitz &
Cottingham, 1960).
Interpretations Based on Dual-Process
Theories of Attitude Change
Interpretations of the impact of fear appeals in terms
of dual-process theories focus on information process-
ing as well as persuasive outcomes. As Gleicher and Petty
(1992) and Liberman and Chaiken (1992) have argued,
fear arousal can have two different effects, namely, act as
a motivator to induce intensive (and accurate) message
processing or induce defense motivation. Because
defense motivation will be aroused when self-
definitional beliefs are being threatened (e.g., the belief
that one is healthy and safe), defense motivation is most
likely to be induced when the health threat is both severe
and personally relevant. According to the multiple
motive version of the Heuristic-Systematic Model, (a)
the processing goal of defense-motivated recipients is to
confirm the validity of particular attitudinal positions
and disconfirm the validity of others and (b) both heuris-
tic and systematic processing modes can serve the
defense-motivated recipients to reach this goal
(Chaiken, Liberman, & Eagly, 1989; Chen & Chaiken,
1999). Thus, defense-motivated individuals will process
information selectively in the way that best supports their
own beliefs. This implies that information that is congru-
ent with a particular preferred attitudinal position will
be evaluated less critically and judged as more valid than
information that is incongruent with this belief (Ditto &
Lopez, 1992; Lord, Ross, & Lepper, 1979; Pyszczynski &
Greenberg, 1987; Pyszczynski, Greenberg, & Holt,
1985).
A Stage Model of the Processing
of Fear-Arousing Communications
Integrating these assumptions with ideas from cogni-
tive stress theory (e.g., Lazarus & Folkman, 1984), we
suggest a stage model of the processing of fear-arousing
information. In line with dual-process theories, our
model assumes that the processing of fear-arousing com-
munication and fear-induced persuasion will depend on
an individual’s processing motivation. Depending on
the severity of the threat and on an individual’s per-
ceived vulnerability, processing motivation can range
from systematic to heuristic, from accuracy motivated to
defense motivated, and from negatively biased to posi-
tively biased. In line with cognitive stress theories, our
model assumes that individuals exposed to a fear-
arousing communication will engage in two types of
appraisal, namely, appraisal of the threat and appraisal
of coping strategies available for reducing the threat.
These two appraisal processes match the two compo-
nents of fear communications, namely, (a) the fear
appeal, which emphasizes the severity of, and vulnerabil-
ity to, a threat; and (b) the action recommendation,
which provides information on how to avoid the health
threat. Because these two parts differ in the extent to
which the message they convey is consistent with the pre-
ferred attitudinal position of the recipient, defense moti-
vation should exert opposite effects on the primary
appraisal of the threat and on the secondary appraisal of
the coping strategies.
Information that makes the individual feel vulnerable
to a nontrivial health threat is likely to induce both sys-
tematic processing motivation and a negative processing
bias in the primary appraisal process because a fear
appeal contains preference-inconsistent information.
The negative bias involves attempts to minimize the
health threat by means of a biased search for inconsisten-
cies and logical errors and a biased evaluation of pre-
sented evidence in the direction of the preferred conclu-
sion. There is now ample empirical support for these
predictions (Ditto & Lopez, 1992; Jemmot, Ditto, &
Croyle, 1986; Kunda, 1987; Liberman & Chaiken, 1992;
Reed & Aspinwall, 1998, Sherman, Nelson & Steele,
2000).
Because attempts to downgrade the health threat will
be constrained by evidence and rules of inference, indi-
viduals will be unlikely to completely reject the threat if
the evidence presented is reasonably persuasive. Thus,
defense motivation will continue to exist in the process-
ing of action recommendations (secondary appraisal).
Because action recommendations present preference-
consistent information (i.e., protection against the
health threat), this information will be processed with a
positive bias. At this stage, individuals will want reassur-
ance. Although the easiest way to feel reassured would be
to accept the recommendation without scrutinizing the
arguments contained in the message, it is not likely that
heuristic processing strategies will prevail when process-
ing motivation is high and the presented information is
relevant. We therefore propose that inducing vulnerabil-
ity to a severe health threat will motivate individuals to
process the action recommendation in a manner that is
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both biased and systematic. This processing will involve
attempts to make the recommendation appear highly
effective by means of biased search for arguments sup-
porting the effectiveness of the protective action and
through biased evaluation of these arguments. This type
of processing is likely to result in increased persuasion
regardless of the quality of the arguments supporting
this recommendation.
Because fear-arousing communications are usually
designed to make individuals feel vulnerable to a severe
health threat, the use of fear is unlikely to result in an
objective evaluation of the action recommendation. It
can, however, be speculated that under conditions of low
vulnerability, increases in severity of a health threat will
result in increased systematic objective processing moti-
vation. After all, it is worthwhile thinking about some
serious threat (e.g., an epidemic in a distant country)
even if it is of no immediate relevance.
Empirical Evidence
There is only one published study that assessed the
processing of action recommendations following threat-
ening information (Gleicher & Petty, 1992). However, a
study by Jepson and Chaiken (1990) assessed a related
issue, namely, the effects of chronic fear on message pro-
cessing. They reported that participants with chronic
fear of cancer detected fewer errors in a message on can-
cer checkups and listed fewer issue-relevant thoughts
than did nonfearful participants. However, fearful par-
ticipants did agree more with the message. These find-
ings suggest that chronic fear of cancer led to less critical
processing and to motivated acceptance of an action
recommendation.
Of more direct relevance is the study of Gleicher and
Petty (1992), who induced low or moderate fear in stu-
dents either about crime (relevant threat) or about an
illness on campus (irrelevant threat). Students were
then presented with a message about a new crime watch
program. At the beginning of the message, a heuristic
cue was presented implying either that the (credible)
source expected the program to be effective or doubted
its effectiveness. Cross-cutting this manipulation, either
weak or strong supporting arguments were presented. In
line with predictions, argument quality resulted in a
main effect on students’ attitude toward the crime watch
program under low fear and in an interaction with the
effectiveness expectation under moderate fear (no
effect of argument quality with clear expectations). How-
ever, inconsistent with predictions, these effects
occurred not only when the fear message was relevant
but also with an irrelevant fear appeal.
Apart from this troubling inconsistency, the findings
of this study leave three important issues unaddressed:
First, we cannot assess how a persuasive message is pro-
cessed when no heuristic cue about the efficacy of a rec-
ommendation is presented. Second, due to the absence
of processing measures, only indirect information on
processing is available (i.e., argument quality effects).
Third, the question of what levels of vulnerability and/or
severity evoke defense motivation has not been
addressed.
Overview
The studies reported in this article were designed to
assess the prediction that increases in vulnerability to a
health risk will induce a systematic positive bias in the
processing of subsequently presented recommenda-
tions, resulting in increased persuasion, regardless of
the quality of the arguments in this recommendation.
Our studies varied vulnerability to and the severity of a
health threat, as well as the quality of the arguments in a
recommendation. Furthermore, following Petty and
Wegener (1999, p. 5) we decided to use additional indi-
cators of intensity and direction of message processing,
namely, the number of issue-relevant thoughts, the pro-
file of issue-relevant thoughts, and the relation between




The hypotheses were tested in a 2 (vulnerability) × 2
(severity of health consequences) × 2 (argument quality
in the action recommendation) factorial design. A total
of 184 male and female students at Utrecht University
received Fl. 10 (5 Euro) for participating in the
experiment.
PROCEDURE
Participants were told that they would be completing
a survey on stress-related health problems. This survey
would contain questionnaires as well as texts. First, par-
ticipants’ self-perceived vulnerability to stress was mea-
sured. This item was presented in between filler items.
Next, severity of the health consequences of stress was
manipulated by presenting participants with one of two
different texts on the health consequences of stress.
Consequences were described as mild (e.g., fever or cold
hands and feet) in the low-severity condition and as quite
serious (e.g., stomach ulcers or heart disease) in the
high-severity condition. Following this manipulation,
participants were presented with a fictitious letter sub-
mitted to an American health journal, which described
stress management training as a way to reduce the risk of
stress-related illnesses. This persuasive message con-
tained either three weak or three strong supporting
arguments. These arguments had either been selected
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from a pool of arguments that had been rated as weak or
strong in a pilot study (Petty & Cacioppo, 1986). After
completing the dependent measures, participants were
very carefully debriefed.
INDEPENDENT VARIABLES
Vulnerability was measured on the basis of a risk-
perception item, measuring participants’ self-rated like-
lihood of ever suffering from stress-related illnesses on a
9-point scale (1 = very small, 9 = very high likelihood). Using
a median split procedure,2 participants were next
divided into a low- (n = 101, M = 3.44) and a high- (n = 83,
M = 6.73) vulnerability group (Mdn = 5). Severity (low,
high) was manipulated by describing the consequences
of stress either as very mild or rather severe. Argument
quality (low, high) was manipulated by using either
three strong or three weak arguments supporting the
action recommended selected on the basis of a pilot
study.
MANIPULATION CHECKS
The severity manipulation was assessed by having par-
ticipants rate on 9-point scales how severe and alarming
they thought the health consequences of stress were (r =
.44). Perceived argument quality of the action recom-
mendation was assessed by one item, asking participants
to rate on a 9-point scale how good or bad they thought
the arguments were (1 = very bad quality; 9 = very good
quality).
DEPENDENT MEASURES
Measures of persuasion. Participants’ attitude toward
the stress management training was assessed with five
semantic differentials, measuring on 9-point scales how
useful, positive, important, interesting, and reliable par-
ticipants perceived the training to be (α = .91). The
intention to participate in a stress management training
was measured on a 9-point scale (1 = definitely not, 9 =
definitely).
Negative affect. To allow for the possibility that a fear
appeal will evoke not only emotions of fear but various
other negative emotions as well, a general measure of
negative affect was used. Stress-related negative affect
was assessed with four semantic differentials, measuring
how good, depressed, anxious, and positive participants
felt about their vulnerability to stress (α = .93). Lower
scores on the scale indicate more negative emotions (1 =
negative, 9 = positive).
Processing measures. To assess the amount and valence
of cognitive processing of the action recommendation, a
thought-listing task was added. Participants were asked
to write down the thoughts they had while reading the




Analyses of variance conducted on the manipulation
checks revealed that both manipulations were success-
ful. A 2 (perceived vulnerability) × 2 (severity) × 2 (argu-
ment quality) factor ANOVA conducted on the severity
index yielded a severity main effect, F(1, 179) = 18.99, p <
.001. Participants in the high-severity condition rated
the consequences of stress as more severe than did par-
ticipants in the low-severity condition (Mhigh = 6.65 vs.
Mlow = 5.64). A similar ANOVA on the manipulation
check for argument quality revealed that the quality of
the arguments in the action recommendation was per-
ceived as higher in the strong-arguments condition
(Mstrong = 5.83) than in the weak-arguments condition
(Mweak = 4.57), F(1, 173) = 20.00, p < .001. No further
effects were found.
DEPENDENT MEASURES
Persuasion. A 2 (perceived vulnerability) × 2 (severity)
× 2 (argument quality) factor ANOVA conducted on the
attitude toward the stress management training revealed
a main effect for vulnerability, F(1, 169) = 9.97, p < .01.
More favorable attitudes toward the recommended solu-
tion were reported when participants felt vulnerable to
stress (M = 6.31) than when participants did not feel vul-
nerable to stress (M = 5.58). In addition, a marginally sig-
nificant three-way interaction between vulnerability,
severity, and argument quality was observed, F(1, 169) =
3.51, p < .06. Simple effects analyses revealed that an
increase in the level of severity led to a near significant
differentiation between strong and weak arguments
under conditions of low vulnerability, F(1, 172) = 3.67, p =
.06. Under conditions of high vulnerability, no signifi-
cant simple effects were observed (see Table 1, top
panel).
A similar ANOVA on the intention to participate in a
stress management training revealed only a significant
main effect of vulnerability, F(1, 173) = 13.18, p < .001.
When vulnerability was high, the intention was higher
(Mhigh = 5.01) than when vulnerability was low (Mlow =
3.88). No effects of severity or argument quality and no
interactions were found.
Negative affect. A 2 (perceived vulnerability) × 2 (sever-
ity) × 2 (argument quality) factor ANOVA conducted on
negative affect revealed a main effect of vulnerability,
F(1, 169) = 23.35, p < .001. When participants felt vulner-
able to stress, they experienced more negative emotions
(M = 6.81) than when they did not feel vulnerable to
stress (M = 7.81).
Processing measures. Two independent raters scored
the number of thoughts in each of three categories: posi-
tive (range 0-4; Kappa =.72), negative (range 0-5; Kappa
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= .72), and neutral thoughts (range 0-5; Kappa = .70)
concerning the action recommendation. A three-factor
ANOVA conducted on the total number of thoughts
revealed a main effect of vulnerability, F(1, 168) = 7.22, p <
.01: Participants who felt vulnerable to the health risk
listed more thoughts (M = 2.29) than participants who
did not feel vulnerable (M = 1.79). No further effects
were observed on the total amount of thoughts listed. A 2
× 2 × 2 ANOVA on the number of positive thoughts
revealed a main effect of vulnerability, F(1, 168) = 8.47, p <
.01. When vulnerability was high, more positive thoughts
were elicited (M = 1.24) than when vulnerability was low
(M = 0.82). No effects of severity and argument quality
were observed. A similar ANOVA conducted on the
number of negative thoughts revealed a main effect of
argument quality, F(1, 168) = 5.89, p < .05. Weak argu-
ments elicited more negative thoughts (M = 1.11) than
did strong arguments (M = 0.71). No further effects were
found on this dependent measure. On neutral thoughts,
no effects of the independent variables were found.
MEDIATION
To assess a possible mediation of the effects of vulner-
ability on measures of persuasion by either negative
emotions concerning the health threat or by thoughts
about the recommended solution, hierarchical regres-
sion analyses were performed on attitudes and inten-
tions with negative affect and positive thoughts about the
action recommendation entered as predictors. Follow-
ing Baron and Kenny (1986), variables were only
entered as possible mediators if the following three con-
ditions were met: (a) The independent variable affected
the mediator, (b) the independent variable affected the
dependent variable, and (c) the mediator affected the
independent variable. These conditions were met by
positive thoughts as a possible mediator for the effects of
vulnerability on attitudes (but not intentions) and nega-
tive affect as a possible mediator for vulnerability on
intentions (but not on attitudes). Negative thoughts
were not entered as a mediator because these thoughts
were not affected by vulnerability. All selected variables
were entered as continuous measures, with the excep-
tion of perceived vulnerability, which was dummy coded
(low, high).
The analyses revealed that the effect of vulnerability
on attitudes was mediated by positive thoughts concern-
ing the action recommendation: Higher levels of vulner-
ability induced more positive thoughts about the action
recommendation, which in turn led to more positive atti-
tudes toward this recommendation. Because attitude is
assumed to be a major determinant of intention (Ajzen,
1988), we entered attitude in addition to negative affect
in assessing the effect of vulnerability on intention. Atti-
tudes were found to mediate the main effect of vulnera-
bility on intention. In addition, stress-related negative
affect significantly added to the mediating effect of atti-
tudes: Higher levels of vulnerability induced more nega-
tive affect, which directly led to higher intentions (see
Table 2).
Discussion
The attitude data provide support for our hypotheses.
When participants felt that they were vulnerable to
stress, their attitude toward the action recommendation
was more positive than when they did not feel vulnera-
ble. This main effect was moderated by a marginally sig-
nificant interaction between vulnerability, severity, and
argument quality. As predicted, increases in severity of
the health risk resulted in a more positive attitude
toward the recommended action when the recommen-
dation was supported by strong rather than weak argu-
ments. Thus, when vulnerability was low, increasing
severity increased individuals’ motivation to scrutinize
the arguments. Although this pattern appeared to be
reversed under conditions of low vulnerability, analysis
of the simple effects revealed that the differentiation
between strong and weak arguments was not significant
when vulnerability was high and severity low. Thus,
inducing high vulnerability resulted in a positive attitude
toward the action recommendation, regardless of sever-
ity and, more important, regardless of the quality of the
arguments.
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TABLE 1: Means (SDs) of Attitudes Toward Recommended Action
by Severity of, and Vulnerability to, Health Threat and Ar-
gument Quality in Experiments 1, 2, and 3
Weak Arguments n Strong Arguments n
Experiment 1a
Low vulnerability
Low severity 5.64 (.32) 22 5.38 (.32) 22
High severity 5.31 (.28) 30 6.06 (.31) 23
High vulnerability
Low severity 6.00 (.33) 21 6.49 (.32) 22
High severity 6.50 (.38) 16 6.28 (.33) 21
Experiment 2b
Low vulnerability
Low severity 4.08 (.29) 12 4.63 (.29) 12
High severity 3.99 (.25) 16 4.55 (.31) 11
High vulnerability
Low severity 4.98 (.25) 16 5.17 (.25) 16
High severity 5.01 (.29) 12 5.23 (.25) 16
Experiment 3b
Low vulnerability
Low severity 4.38 (.23) 15 4.63 (.25) 13
High severity 4.87 (.23) 16 5.16 (.23) 16
High vulnerability
Low severity 4.86 (.25) 13 5.12 (.25) 16
High severity 4.79 (.23) 16 4.94 (.23) 16
a. 9-point scale. Higher values indicate more positive attitude.
b. 7-point scale. Higher values indicate more positive attitude.
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For the intention of respondents to participate in a
stress management training and, thus, to accept the
action recommendation, only a main effect of vulnera-
bility was observed. Individuals who felt that they were at
risk of suffering from stress-related illness at some future
date were more willing to participate in the stress
management training. The same main effect was observed
on stress-related negative affect: High-vulnerability
participants experienced more negative affect than low-
vulnerability participants.
If we operationalize systematic processing only in
terms of an impact of argument quality on persuasion,
the impact of argument quality on attitudes under
low vulnerability conditions is the only evidence for
argument-relevant thinking. However, as inspection of
the thought-listing data indicates, this conclusion would
be oversimplified. “Other procedures for assessing the
extent of mental effort include assessment of the num-
ber and profile of issue-relevant thoughts” (Petty &
Wegener, 1999, p. 53). Thus, the fact that respondents
who felt highly vulnerable produced a greater number
of thoughts than those who felt less vulnerable suggests
more systematic processing under high vulnerability.
This apparent contradiction can be resolved by looking
at positive and negative thoughts separately. The fact
that there is a main effect of vulnerability on number of
positive but not negative thoughts suggests that the pat-
tern we observe is indicative of processing that is system-
atic and biased. Our respondents engage in issue-rele-
vant thinking and, as the main effect of argument quality
on negative thoughts indicates, they are quite able to dis-
tinguish strong from weak arguments. However, to arrive
at their preferred conclusion that the recommended
action offers protection, they engage in positive think-
ing, and this tendency is stronger the more they perceive
themselves as vulnerable.
Mediation analyses corroborate the biased processing
hypothesis, revealing that the effect of vulnerability on
participants’ attitude toward the action recommenda-
tion was partly mediated by positive but not negative
thoughts about this recommendation. The attitude, in
turn, partly mediated vulnerability effects on the inten-
tion to participate in stress management training, the
recommended solution. This finding is in line with social
cognitive models of behavior, in which attitude is postu-
lated to be a proximal determinant of intention (Ajzen,
1988). However, in contrast with these models, stress-
related negative affect was found to add to the mediating
effect of attitudes on intentions. This finding suggests
that the acceptance of a recommended action can be
inherently reinforcing, most likely because it may lead to
a reduction of negative emotions induced by a fear
appeal (Hovland et al., 1953). In conclusion, both nega-
tive emotions about the health threat and positive
thoughts concerning the recommended solution to this
threat (via attitudes) mediated the persuasive effects of
vulnerability on intentions.
EXPERIMENT 2
To validate the findings of Experiment 1, a second
study was conducted in which we strengthened the
manipulation of argument quality by increasing the
number of weak and of strong arguments from three to
eight. Cross-cutting the vulnerability and severity manip-
ulations taken from Experiment 1, we also added a
marker condition aimed at inducing extensive process-
ing of the action recommendation. In this condition,
participants were led to believe that they would later
have to defend their opinion in a group discussion. We
reasoned that if the persuasion effects of high vulnerabil-
ity obtained in Experiment 1 were in fact due to
suboptimal levels of message processing instead of
biased systematic processing, effects of argument quality
on persuasion would have to be evident in the marker
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TABLE 2: Results of Hierarchical Regression Analyses Predicting At-
titudes, Intentions, and Request for Information in Exper-
iments 1, 2, and 3
Experiment 1 Experiment 2 Experiment 3
Dependent Variable R2 R2 R2
Attitude
Step 1
Vulnerability .23** .06** .38*** .14***
Step 2
Vulnerability .12ns .25**
Positive thoughts .44*** .37** .27***
Intention
Step 1
Vulnerability .25*** .06*** .56*** .31*** .27** .07**
Step 2
Vulnerability .09ns .42*** .23**
Attitudes .65*** .40*** .37*** .11*** .47*** .22***
Step 3
Vulnerability .03ns .35*** .19*
Attitudes .66*** .35*** .46***
Negative affect –.14* .02* –.18* .03* –.15* .02*
Experiment 2 Experiment 2 Experiment 3
Request for Request for
Dependent Variable Information Subscriptions Information
R2 R2 R2
Step 1
Vulnerability .34*** .12*** .43*** .19*** .29** .08**
Step 2
Vulnerability .06ns .11ns .15ns
Intention .72*** .35*** .57*** .22*** .53*** .26***
*p < .05. **p < .01. ***p < .001.
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condition only. Finally, the assessment of the existing
dependent measures was refined and two behavioral
measures were added to assess whether the vulnerability




The hypotheses were tested in a 2 (vulnerability) × 2
(severity of health consequences) × 2 (systematic pro-
cessing instructions) × 2 (argument quality in the action
recommendation) design. A total of 111 male and
female 1st-year graduate students at the Utrecht Univer-
sity received Fl. 15 (8 Euro) for participating in the
experiment.
INDEPENDENT VARIABLES
Vulnerability to the possible health consequences of
stress was measured on the basis of a six-item 7-point
scale of participants’ perceived vulnerability to stress
(e.g., “The probability that I will develop stress-related
health problems is high”; “Due to my sensitivity to stress,
I am more prone to stress-related health problems”; α =
.92). Participants were divided by median split into
either a low- (n = 51, M = 2.25) or a high- (n = 60, M =
4.42) vulnerability group (Mdn = 3.50). Severity (low,
high) was manipulated in the same way as in Experiment
1. Argument quality (low, high) was manipulated by
using either eight strong or eight weak arguments sup-
portive of the action recommendation. Three strong
and three weak arguments were copied from Experi-
ment 1. The remaining arguments were again selected
in a pilot study. In the marker condition, participants
were instructed to read the action recommendation
carefully because they would have to defend their opin-
ion on this text in a group discussion later on in the
experiment. In the other condition, no such instructions
were given.
PROCEDURE
In the present study, all questionnaires and texts were
presented on computer terminals. Other than that, the
procedure that was followed was identical to the one
used in Experiment 1.
MANIPULATION CHECKS
The effectiveness of the severity manipulation was
assessed by three items measuring on a 7-point scale how
severe, damaging, and serious the health consequences
of stress were perceived to be (α = .81). Perceived argu-
ment quality of the action recommendation was assessed
by three items, measuring on a 7-point scale how strong,
supportive, and sensible participants rated the argu-
ments (α = .88). The effectiveness of the marker condi-
tion was assessed by three items, measuring on a 7-point
scale participants’ effort in understanding and thinking
about the text, thoroughness in reading the text, and
perceived success in recalling the text (α = .69).
DEPENDENT VARIABLES
Persuasion. Participants’ attitude toward the stress
management training was assessed by a semantic differ-
ential scale with six items, measuring on a 7-point scale
how good, useful, reliable, important, interesting, and
effective participants thought this training was (α = .87).
Participants’ intention to participate in a stress manage-
ment training was measured by four items on a 7-point
scale. Examples are as follows: “Do you intend to partici-
pate in a stress management training?” and “How likely is
it that you are going to participate in a stress manage-
ment training?” (α = .89). Two behavioral measures were
added to assess participants’ reactions toward the stress
management training. Participants could directly sub-
scribe to a stress management training (five sessions of 2
hours); this item had a “yes” or “no” option. Participants
also could request more information about the training;
this item also had a “yes” or “no” option.
Negative affect. Stress-related affect was assessed with a
nine-item semantic differential scale. Participants had to
indicate how depressed, fearful, insecure, relaxed, at
ease, helpless, positive, tense, and pessimistic they felt
when thinking about the consequences of stress (α =
.89). Lower scores on the scale indicate more negative
affect.
Processing measures. To assess the amount of cognitive
processing of the action recommendation, a thought-
listing task was added. Participants were instructed to
enter all thoughts they had concerning the action rec-
ommendation, including their feelings and ideas about




A 2 (vulnerability) × 2 (severity) × 2 (argument qual-
ity) × 2 (processing instructions) analysis of variance was
conducted on all manipulation checks. The ANOVA on
the severity index yielded a severity main effect, F(1, 95)
= 12.91, p < .001. Participants in the high-severity condi-
tion rated the consequences of stress as more severe than
participants in the low-severity condition (Mhigh = 5.38 vs.
Mlow = 4.73). No further effects were found. The manipu-
lation check on extensive processing instructions
revealed that participants’ perceived effort and consci-
entiousness in reading the recommendation was greater
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with systematic processing instructions (M = 4.74) than
without systematic processing instructions (M = 4.29),
F(1, 95) = 4.88, p < .05. No further effects were observed
on this variable. The ANOVA on the manipulation check
of perceived argument quality revealed that the quality
of the arguments in the persuasive message was per-
ceived as higher in the strong-arguments condition
(Mstrong = 4.40) than in the weak-arguments condition
(Mweak = 3.62), F(1, 95) = 10.05, p < .01. Also, an interac-
tion between severity and systematic processing
instructions was found on perceived argument quality,
F(1, 95) = 6.48, p < .05. No significant simple effects were
observed, suggesting that overall, perceived argument
quality increased with systematic processing instructions
under high-severity conditions (M = 3.73 vs. M = 4.26,
respectively) but decreased with similar instructions
under low-severity conditions (M = 4.36 vs. M = 3.69,
respectively). No further effects were found.
DEPENDENT MEASURES
Persuasion. A 2 × 2 × 2 × 2 ANOVA was conducted on
participants’ attitude toward stress management train-
ing, revealing two main effects. A significant main effect
of perceived vulnerability was observed, F(1, 95) = 16.49,
p < .001; when vulnerability was perceived as high, the
attitude toward the training was more favorable (M =
5.10) than when perceived vulnerability was low (M =
4.28). Also, a main effect of argument quality was found,
F(1, 95) = 3.99, p < .05, indicating that the attitude was
more favorable when the recommendation contained
strong arguments (M = 4.94) rather than weak argu-
ments (M = 4.51). Although no significant interaction
between vulnerability and argument quality was
observed, simple effects analyses did reveal that the argu-
ment quality effect on attitudes was only significant
under conditions of low vulnerability, F(1, 108) = 4.55, p <
.05. Under conditions of high vulnerability, no differen-
tiation between strong and weak arguments was
observed, F(1, 108) = 0.83, ns (see Table 1, middle
panel).
A 2 × 2 × 2 × 2 ANOVA on participants’ intention to
participate in a stress management training revealed
only one significant effect, namely, a main effect of vul-
nerability, F(1, 95) = 49.53, p < .001. When vulnerability
was high, the intention was higher (Mhigh = 4.73) than
when vulnerability was low (Mlow = 2.93). No effects of
severity, instructions, or argument quality and no inter-
actions were found.
The effects of the independent variables on the
behavioral measures were tested with logistic regression
analyses. A main effect of vulnerability was observed on
participants’ request for more information about the
training, Wald(1) = 12.58, p < .001; when vulnerability
was perceived as high, participants more often requested
more information on the stress management training
(88.3%) than when vulnerability was low (58.8%). On
participants’ actual subscription to the stress manage-
ment training, again a main effect of vulnerability was
found, Wald(1) = 16.86, p < .001, indicating that partici-
pants more often subscribed to the training when vul-
nerability was perceived as high (50%) rather than low
(9.8%). No further main effects or interactions were
found.
Negative affect. A 2 × 2 × 2 × 2 ANOVA on stress-related
affect also revealed a main effect of vulnerability, F(1, 95)
= 28.83, p < .001, with high-vulnerability participants
experiencing more negative affect (M = 4.78) than low-
vulnerability participants (M = 5.53). Furthermore, a
four-way interaction was observed between all independ-
ent variables, F(1, 95) = 5.51, p < .05. Simple effects analy-
ses revealed that argument quality had an effect on
stress-related emotions when vulnerability was low, sever-
ity was high, and no systematic processing instructions
were given, F(1, 102) = 6.43, p < .05. Only in this specific
condition, more negative emotions were experienced
when arguments were weak (M = 4.89) rather than
strong (M = 6.07). No other simple effects were
observed. Considering the difficulty in interpreting this
four-way interaction, this effect will not be further dis-
cussed. No other effects were found.
Processing measures. Inspection of the cognitive
responses showed that participants’ responses could be
categorized as cognitive; no affective responses to the
action recommendation were listed. Two independent
judges rated the number of thoughts in each of three cat-
egories: positive (range 0-2; Kappa = .73), negative
(range 0-2; Kappa = .81), and neutral thoughts (range 0-
2). Because only five participants listed neutral thoughts
concerning the action recommendation, this category
was deleted. With respect to the total number of
thoughts, a marginally significant main effect of vulnera-
bility was observed, F(1, 103) = 3.18, p = .08; more
thoughts were listed when vulnerability was high (M =
1.24) rather than low (M = 0.94). A main effect of exten-
sive processing instructions also was observed, F(1, 103)
= 4.91, p < .05, indicating more thoughts were listed with
these instructions (M = 1.28) than without (M = 0.90). In
addition, an interaction between vulnerability and argu-
ment quality was observed on the total number of
thoughts, F(1, 103) = 5.80, p < .05. Simple effects analyses
revealed that participants differentiated between strong
and weak arguments only under conditions of high vul-
nerability, F(1, 108) = 3.65, p < .05. On the amount of pos-
itive thoughts, a main effect of vulnerability again was
observed, F(1, 103) = 12.94, p < .001, indicating that
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high- vulnerability participants more often listed positive
thoughts (M = 0.67) than low-vulnerability participants
(M = 0.23). This main effect was qualified, however, by a
significant interaction between vulnerability and argu-
ment quality, F(1, 103) = 3.77, p < .05. An ANOVA was
conducted to determine simple effects, revealing a dif-
ferentiation between strong and weak arguments only
under conditions of high vulnerability, F(1, 108) = 4.67,
p < .05. No further effects were found.
With respect to negative thoughts, a marginally signif-
icant main effect of processing instructions was
observed, F(1, 103) = 3.43, p = .07: When extensive pro-
cessing instructions were given, more negative thoughts
were listed (M = 0.76) than when no such instructions
were given (M = 0.53). No further effects were found.
Mediation analyses. To assess a possible mediation of
the effects of the independent variables on measures of
persuasion by either negative emotions concerning the
health threat or by cognitive responses to the action rec-
ommendation, regression analyses were performed on
attitudes and intentions. Variables were selected as possi-
ble mediators only when the three conditions specified
in Experiment 1 were met (Baron & Kenny, 1986). Posi-
tive thoughts met the criteria as a possible mediator for
the effects of vulnerability and argument quality on atti-
tudes. Negative thoughts did not meet these criteria.
Negative affect met the criteria as a possible mediator for
vulnerability on intentions (but not on attitudes). Simi-
lar to Experiment 1, perceived vulnerability was entered
as a dummy variable (low, high).
Similar to Experiment 1, positive thoughts were
found to mediate the effects of vulnerability on attitudes
(see Table 2). However, unlike Experiment 1, positive
thoughts (β = .44, p < .001) mediated the effects of argu-
ment quality on attitudes (Step 1: β = .20, p < .01, ∆R 2 =
.04, p < .01; Step 2: β = .14, ns, ∆R 2 = .19, p < .001). Also
similar to Experiment 1, the intention was predicted
both by the attitude toward the action recommendation
and by negative stress-related affect. Thus, similar to
Experiment 1, a high vulnerability to the health risk
evoked both a positive attitude about the action recom-
mendation and negative emotions about the health risk.
Both attitudes and negative affect were found to predict
intentions to participate in the recommended solution.
Finally, the effects of vulnerability on both behavioral
measures were found to be mediated by intentions (see
Table 2).
Discussion
The findings of the present study replicate and
extend the results of Experiment 1. On participants’ atti-
tude, again, a main effect of vulnerability was observed.
Attitudes toward stress management training were more
favorable when participants felt vulnerable to stress. In
addition, a main effect of the quality of the arguments in
the persuasive message was observed, indicating more
favorable attitudes when the recommendation was sup-
ported by strong rather than weak arguments. Contrary
to the findings in Experiment 1, the severity of the conse-
quences of stress had no effect on attitudes. Similarly, no
effects of the systematic processing instructions were
observed on this measure of persuasion. Thus, in the
present experiment, participants’ perception of the
action recommendation was more favorable when it con-
tained strong, rather than weak, arguments and when
participants felt vulnerable to the health risk. Although
no significant interaction between vulnerability and
argument quality was observed, which given our small
sample size could be due to a lack of power,3 additional
post hoc analyses did reveal that similar to Experiment 1,
the quality of the arguments in the recommendation
affected attitudes only under conditions of low vulnera-
bility. When vulnerability was perceived as high, attitudes
were favorable regardless of the quality of the arguments
in the recommendation and regardless of the severity of
the consequences of the health risk.
As in Experiment 1, the intention to participate in the
stress management training was only affected by vulnera-
bility. However, when individuals felt vulnerable, not
only were they more likely to plan to participate but they
also were more likely to request information about the
training and, in fact, even to sign up for it. Thus, half of
the high-vulnerability individuals signed up for stress
management training (expected to consist of five 2-hour
sessions) as compared to only 10% of the low-vulnerability
individuals. Neither argument quality nor the severity of
the consequences of the health risk had a direct effect on
any of these measures. Similarly, the specific processing
instructions had no effect on the various measures of
persuasion: No main effects or interactions with argu-
ment quality were found. Finally, whereas the impact of
vulnerability on behavioral intentions was only partly
mediated by attitudes, the impact on actual behavior
(i.e., signing up for the program) was fully mediated by
behavioral intentions.
The findings in Experiment 1 also were replicated for
negative emotions concerning the health threat. On
stress-related negative affect, only a main effect of per-
ceived vulnerability was observed, indicating more nega-
tive affect for high vulnerability of the health risk rather
than low. As in Experiment 1, stress-related affect was
one of the factors that mediated the impact of vulnera-
bility on behavioral intention (see Table 2). This sug-
gests anxiety reduction as one of the reasons for individ-
uals to accept the recommendation.
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With regard to the processing measures, the pattern is
similar but not identical to that observed in Experiment
1. Nonetheless, all findings are consistent with the
assumption that respondents who perceived themselves
as not very vulnerable processed the information about
the action recommendation in a systematic and unbi-
ased manner, whereas high-vulnerability individuals pro-
cessed systematically and biased. Because the observed
pattern is somewhat complex, we will summarize the evi-
dence for both depth and bias of processing. Several
findings suggest that both low- and high-vulnerability
participants processed the recommendation systemati-
cally: (a) Given all the indications that our systematic
processing instructions were indeed successful in induc-
ing systematic processing, the fact that there are no inter-
actions between these instructions and vulnerability
suggests a high level of systematic processing in both
vulnerability conditions; (b) there was an effect of
argument quality on attitudes; (c) the fact that high-
vulnerability individuals produced marginally more
thoughts and significantly more positive thoughts than
low-vulnerability individuals suggests increased rather
than decreased processing intensity; and (d) the interac-
tion between vulnerability and argument quality on posi-
tive thoughts revealed that high-vulnerability partici-
pants differentiated between strong and weak
arguments. There is also evidence of a positive process-
ing bias for highly vulnerable respondents: (a) High-
vulnerability participants had more positive thoughts—
but not more negative thoughts—about the recommen-
dation as compared to low-vulnerability participants,
particularly for strong arguments; and (b) as in Experi-
ment 1, the effects of vulnerability on attitudes were
mainly mediated by positive thoughts, not negative
thoughts.
In summary, then, the findings of Experiment 2 again
provide support for the main hypotheses underlying our
research program, namely, that arguments contained in
recommendations that promise protection against some
nontrivial health threat are processed systematically and
that this processing reflects a positivity bias for individu-
als who feel highly vulnerable. Possibly, the fact that the
current pattern of findings on cognitive responses
slightly deviated from the one observed in Experiment 1
was caused by the adding of the marker condition in the
current study. Our findings also suggest that vulnerabil-
ity is an important determinant in motivating individuals
to take action.
EXPERIMENT 3
In Experiments 1 and 2, the measure of vulnerability
was based on participants’ already existing perceptions
of their personal vulnerability to stress, which leaves
open the possibility that the effects of vulnerability on
persuasion were in fact caused by a third—unknown—
factor. To rule out this possibility, a third experiment was
conducted, in which vulnerability to stress was manipu-




The same 2 (vulnerability) × 2 (severity of health con-
sequences) × 2 (argument quality) factor design was
used as in Experiment 1. A total of 118 male and female
students at the University of Utrecht participated and
received a compensation of Fl. 10 (5 Euro).
PROCEDURE
All texts were presented on the computer screen and
responses to the questions were typed (using
Authorware). In the introduction, participants were told
that a new scale had recently been developed—the Chi-
cago Stress Vulnerability Inventory (CSVI)—to measure
the risk of individuals of developing stress-related health
problems in the future. Participants also were informed
that research had shown that people’s own perceived
stress resistance was unrelated to the Stress Vulnerability
Score and that their perception of their own stress resis-
tance was not a good predictor of their future risk of
developing stress-related health problems. In reality, the
CSVI consisted of three scales with a total of 54 items
measuring neuroticism, introversion-extraversion, and
schizoid-type personality traits. Participants had to fill in
the CSVI and then received false feedback on their com-
puter screens. In the low-vulnerability condition, partici-
pants were informed that their future risk of developing
stress-related illnesses was low. In the condition of high
vulnerability, participants were led to believe that their
future risk of developing stress-related illnesses was quite
high. The manipulations of severity of consequences
and argument quality were identical to the ones used in
Experiment 2. After completing the questionnaires by
computer, participants were carefully debriefed.
MANIPULATION CHECKS
The effectiveness of the vulnerability manipulation
was assessed by having participants rate six items on their
own perceived vulnerability on a 7-point scale. Examples
are as follows: “The chance that I will develop stress-
related health problems is high” and “Due to my sensitiv-
ity to stress I am more prone to stress-related health
problems” (α = .92). The manipulation checks of sever-
ity (α = .82) and argument quality (α = .90) were copied
from Experiment 2.
DEPENDENT MEASURES4
Persuasion. All dependent measures of persuasion
were copied from Experiment 2: participants’ attitude
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toward the recommended action (α = .82), the intention
to participate in a stress management training (α = .83),
as well as the behavioral measures of request for more
information about stress management training (yes/no)
and subscriptions to the training (yes/no).
Negative affect. Stress-related affect was assessed with
the scale used in Experiment 2 (α = .93). Lower scores on
the scale indicate more negative affect.
Results
MANIPULATION CHECKS
To assess the effectiveness of the manipulations, 2
(vulnerability) × 2 (severity) × 2 (argument quality) fac-
tor ANOVAs were conducted on the manipulation
checks for vulnerability, severity, and argument quality.
The analyses revealed that all manipulations had been
effective. Vulnerability was perceived as significantly
higher in the high- (M = 3.70) than in the low-vulnerability
condition (M = 2.81), F(1, 110) = 17.34, p < .001. The
analysis of the severity index yielded a main effect of
severity, F(1, 110) = 4.87, p < .05. High-severity partici-
pants rated the consequences of stress as more severe
than low-severity participants (Mhigh = 5.58 vs. Mlow =
5.18). There was also a main effect of vulnerability on
this variable: High-vulnerability participants rated the
consequences of stress as less severe (Mhigh = 5.08) than
did low-vulnerability participants (Mlow = 5.70), F(1, 110) =
11.40, p < .005. A main effect of argument quality was
observed on the check for argument quality, F(1, 110) =
6.96, p < .05. The quality of the arguments in the persua-
sive message was perceived as higher in the strong-
arguments condition (Mstrong = 4.51) than in the weak-
arguments condition (Mweak = 3.86). No further effects
were observed.
DEPENDENT MEASURES
Persuasion. The 2 (vulnerability) × 2 (severity) × 2
(argument quality) ANOVA conducted on the attitude
toward stress management training revealed a margin-
ally significant interaction between vulnerability and
severity, F(1, 114) = 3.70, p = 06. Simple effects analyses
revealed that an increase in severity led to more positive
attitudes under conditions of low vulnerability, F(1, 115) =
4.72, p < .05. This effect was not observed when vulnera-
bility was high. No further effects were found (see Table
1, bottom panel).
A similar ANOVA on participants’ intention to partici-
pate in a stress management training resulted in a main
effect of vulnerability, F(1, 110) = 9.47, p < .01: When vul-
nerability was high, the intention was higher (Mhigh =
4.69) than when vulnerability was low (Mlow = 3.88). No
effects of severity or argument quality were found.
The effects of the independent variables on the
request for more information about stress management
training were tested using logistic regression. A main
effect of vulnerability was found, Wald(1) = 10.98, p <
.001: When vulnerability was high, participants more
often requested additional information about the train-
ing (55.5%) than when vulnerability was low (36.7%).
This effect was qualified by a significant interaction
between vulnerability and severity, Wald(1) = 5.60, p <
.05: When severity was low, the request was greater when
participants felt vulnerable to the health risk (76.9%)
than when they did not feel vulnerable (25%). When
severity was high, no significant differences between low
(46.9%) and high vulnerability (56.3%) were observed.
No additional effects of argument quality were found on
this measure.
On the subscription to the training, no effects of the
independent variables were found. In total, there were
only nine subscriptions (7.6%).
Negative affect. A 2 × 2 × 2 ANOVA on stress-related
negative affect yielded a main effect for personal vulner-
ability, F(1, 110) = 7.43, p < .01. High-vulnerability partici-
pants reported experiencing significantly more negative
affect (M = 3.23) than low-vulnerability participants (M =
3.63). No further effects were found.
Mediation. To assess a possible mediation of the effects
of vulnerability on persuasion by either negative emo-
tions concerning the health threat or by attitudes toward
the action recommendation, regression analyses were
performed following the three criteria specified in
Experiment 1 (Baron & Kenny, 1986). These analyses
revealed mediating effects for both attitudes and nega-
tive affect on participants’ intentions. Furthermore, par-
ticipants’ intentions to participate in the recommended
solution mediated the effect of vulnerability on the
behavioral measure of request for information (see
Table 2).
Discussion
There was a marginally significant interaction
between vulnerability and severity on attitudes toward
the action recommendation. Increases in severity had
greater impact on attitudes under conditions of low
rather than high vulnerability. Unlike in Experiments 1
and 2, argument quality did not affect attitudes despite a
successful manipulation of this variable. Intention was
only affected by personal vulnerability. Participants who
felt at risk of suffering from stress-related illnesses were
more willing to accept the recommended action. No
effects of severity or argument quality were observed on
this measure. These main effects of vulnerability on
intention replicate the findings from Experiment 1 and
2, in which the measure of vulnerability was based on
self-perception.
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In line with the findings for intentions, the data on
the request for information again revealed a main effect
of vulnerability. Thus, under high-vulnerability condi-
tions, participants not only were more likely to express
the intention to participate in a stress management
training but also were more likely to request information
about the training on offer. However, on requests for
information, this main effect of vulnerability was moder-
ated by the severity of the threat. Additional analyses
revealed that high-vulnerability participants requested
additional information more often than low-vulnerability
participants only when the consequences of the health
risk were portrayed as quite mild. No differences
between low- and high-vulnerability participants were
observed when the consequences of the health risk were
presented as quite severe. No effects of argument quality
were found on behavior.
The findings on the measure of stress-related negative
affect replicate the findings of Experiment 1 and 2. Only
a main effect of vulnerability was observed on this mea-
sure, with high-vulnerability participants experiencing
more negative emotions than low-vulnerability partici-
pants. Also similar to Experiments 1 and 2, the effect of
vulnerability on participants’ intention was partly medi-
ated by both the attitude toward the recommended solu-
tion and stress-related negative emotions. Participants’
intention, in turn, was the sole predictor of the behav-
ioral measure of requests for information about the rec-
ommended solution.
Experiment 3 also provided evidence indicative of a
negative bias in the processing of information about a
health treat. Participants who had been informed that
they were at high risk of developing stress-related prob-
lems rated the consequences of such illnesses as less
alarming and less severe than participants who had been
told that they were not vulnerable to stress. These find-
ings are in line with those of Ditto and Lopez (1992),
Kunda (1987), Liberman and Chaiken (1992), and Reed
and Aspinwall (1998). In all of these studies, the manipu-
lation of personal vulnerability of a health risk resulted
in high-vulnerability participants reacting to the health
threat with minimizing responses (Hovland et al., 1953):
downgrading the importance of the threat, not believing
it, or questioning the validity of the measures used. It is
quite likely that a manipulation of vulnerability evokes
stronger reactions than self-perceptions of vulnerability,
which may explain why this minimizing response was
found in the present experiment but not in Experiments 1
and 2.
GENERAL DISCUSSION
This series of studies has been conducted to test pre-
dictions derived from a stage model of the processing of
fear-arousing communications. According to this
model, informing individuals that they are vulnerable to
a nontrivial health threat will induce biased systematic
processing of an action recommendation that promises
protection against the health threat. Because increasing
vulnerability will increase the motivation of message
recipients to perceive the recommended action as effec-
tive, perceived vulnerability to the threat also should be
the major determinant of attitude and behavior change.
The pattern of findings reported in this article sup-
ported this prediction. In the three studies reported
here, the measures of persuasion were mainly affected by
vulnerability. When participants felt vulnerable to the
health risk, their intention to participate in the recom-
mended action was greater, they more often requested
information about the training, and they more often
subscribed to this training. Furthermore, vulnerability
was the major determinant of attitudes toward the action
recommendation as well: Increases in vulnerability
invariably led to more positive attitudes in each experi-
ment. The effects of severity and argument quality on
attitudes were less consistent across studies and thus pre-
vent us from drawing any definitive conclusions about
the effects of these variables on persuasion. Nonetheless,
the general pattern of findings seems to suggest that if
severity and argument quality had an effect on attitudes,
it was observed mainly under conditions of low
vulnerability.
At first glance, the absence of consistent argument
quality effects on measures of persuasion for high-
vulnerability participants seems to suggest that these
individuals processed the recommendation heuristi-
cally. However, the cognitive response measures of
Experiments 1 and 2 show that this was not the case. In
both experiments, high-vulnerability participants listed
more thoughts and also more positive (but not negative)
thoughts about the recommended solution, suggesting
increases rather than decreases in the depth of process-
ing. In addition, high-vulnerability participants were
found to differentiate between strong and weak argu-
ments in both experiments. In Experiment 1, they listed
more negative thoughts about weak rather than strong
arguments. In Experiment 2, they listed more positive
thoughts about strong than weak arguments. Further-
more, in both studies, only positive cognitive responses
to the recommended action mediated the effects of vul-
nerability on attitudes toward the recommended solu-
tion. Taken together, these findings suggest that high-
vulnerability participants were motivated to focus mainly
on the positive aspects of the action recommendation
and thus to bias their evaluation of the evidence pre-
sented in support of the recommended action.
Of interest, in all three studies, participants’ negative
emotions were found partly to mediate the impact of
perceived vulnerability on their intentions. This added
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to the effect of participants’ attitude toward the recom-
mended action, the primary predictor of intention. No
such mediating effects of negative emotions were
observed for the impact of vulnerability on attitudes
toward the action recommendation. Thus, negative
emotions evoked by perceived vulnerability to the health
risk directly affected intentions to participate in the rec-
ommended solution, regardless of participants’ atti-
tudes toward the recommendation. The intention to
participate in the recommended action was found to be
the unique predictor of behavior, as measured by actual
subscriptions to the stress management training. These
findings suggest that both negative feelings concerning
the health threat and positive thoughts concerning the
projected solution to this threat may—indirectly—medi-
ate the persuasive effects of vulnerability on actual
behavior.
Theoretical Implications: Assessing Depth
and Direction of Message Processing
Our findings demonstrate the value of including vari-
ous measures of cognitive processing when assessing the
processing of threatening health information. The pro-
cesses underlying fear-induced persuasion were shown
to be very subtle, involving attempts to minimize some
parts of a fear-arousing message and maximize other
parts of the same message. The differences observed in
the effects of the independent variables on the various
measures of cognitive processing (i.e., variations in argu-
ment quality, variations in the amount of cognitive pro-
cessing, and variations in the valence of cognitive pro-
cessing) make an important point: They show that,
under defense motivation, indirect measures of persua-
sion such as the effect of the quality of the arguments in a
persuasive message do not suffice for measuring either
the extent or the direction of message elaboration. This
is especially evident in Experiment 1, where the absence
of argument quality effects under conditions of high vul-
nerability suggests decreases in the depth of processing,
as compared to conditions of low vulnerability, whereas
the cognitive processing measures provide a different
and more detailed picture: an increase in the total num-
ber of thoughts and in the number of positive thoughts
and a significant differentiation between strong and
weak arguments. These findings validate Killeya and
Johnson’s (1998) argument that when a persuasive mes-
sage is processed in a biased fashion, the absence of argu-
ment quality effects on measures of persuasion need not
imply the absence of message elaboration. Thus, our
findings suggest limits to the argument quality para-
digm. They also demonstrate the benefits of adding
direct measures of cognitive processing when assessing
directional biases in the processing of persuasive
messages.
Theoretical Implications: Reevaluating
Classical Fear Appeal Theories
Our finding that defense motivation induced a sys-
tematic positive bias in the processing of an action rec-
ommendation has implications for other theoretical
conceptualization of the processing and acceptance of
action recommendations following the use of fear
appeals. It implies that stressing an individual’s vulnera-
bility to a health risk in a fear appeal will not induce
either increased objective systematic processing, as pos-
ited by Rogers and Prentice-Dunn (1997), or a motivated
acceptance of recommendations based on heuristic pro-
cessing strategies, as Gleicher and Petty (1992) pro-
posed. Instead, individuals who are vulnerable to a
health risk will be motivated to focus mainly on the posi-
tive aspects of the recommendations and to bias their
evaluation of the arguments in this recommendation.
These findings demonstrate the importance of differen-
tiating between vulnerability and severity of a health
threat when assessing message processing and persua-
sion effects of a fear appeal. Most previous studies did
not differentiate between vulnerability and severity
within their manipulation of fear level. Thus, little infor-
mation is available on the independent effects of these
two variables on the processing of persuasive messages
and on persuasion. However, similar to our findings, vul-
nerability appeared to have a more powerful effect on
intention than severity in studies in which the two vari-
ables were manipulated separately to assess persua-
sion—but not processing—effects of both variables
(e.g., Maddux & Rogers, 1983; Rogers & Mewborn,
1976). Also, as some have suggested, it may be that
“severity must reach a certain magnitude to figure in
health decisions, but once that magnitude has been
reached decisions are solely a function of perceived sus-
ceptibility” (Sheeran & Abraham, 1996, p. 34). Consis-
tent with this notion, in all three studies, persuasion, as
well as processing measures, was mainly affected by per-
sonal vulnerability.
Our findings also may reconcile some of the inconsis-
tencies that have been observed in fear appeal literature.
As was mentioned in our introduction, the lack of reli-
able interaction between fear and efficacy (see Rogers &
Prentice-Dunn, 1997), as well as the typically observed
main effects of fear/threat on persuasion (Sutton,
1982), is inconsistent with predictions of all classical the-
ories of fear appeals. However, in terms of our stage
model, they can be accounted for by proposing that a
positive processing bias may apply to efficacy expecta-
tions in the same way it applied to the quality of the argu-
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ments in the experiments presented in this article.
Hence, it can be argued that variations in response effi-
cacy will be most likely to affect persuasion when an indi-
vidual’s vulnerability to a health risk is low because in this
case, he is most likely to process recommendations sys-
tematically as well as objectively. However, an individual
who feels vulnerable to a health risk will be defense moti-
vated, resulting in positive bias in the processing of effi-
cacy information and, consequently, in increased per-
suasion regardless of variations in response efficacy.
Finally, our findings suggest that fear-induced persua-
sion is neither strictly motivational nor strictly cognitive
in nature; it is best seen as a combination of both.
According to the Drive Model (Hovland et al., 1953),
emotional tension is a necessary condition for fear
appeals to induce persuasion. In contrast, Protection
Motivation Theory (Rogers & Prentice-Dunn, 1997)
explains fear-induced persuasion in strictly cognitive
terms. The findings of our studies suggest that both theo-
ries are partly right and partly wrong: The impact of vul-
nerability on persuasion is mediated by both negative
feelings concerning the health threat and positive
thoughts concerning the proposed protective action.
Thus, cognitions did mediate the effects of fear appeals
on persuasion. However, people were not as rational as
was assumed by Protection Motivation Theory because
the action recommendation was not evaluated objec-
tively but in a biased fashion. Furthermore, negative
emotions about the health risk did seem to lead to per-
suasion in our studies. But it did not do so via the evalua-
tion of the efficacy of the recommendation in reducing
the emotional tension, as was predicted by the Drive
Model. Instead, higher levels of negative affect directly
increased intentions to participate in a recommended
action in all three experiments. It thus seems that the
emotional tension evoked by a high vulnerability to a
health risk leads to some sort of action tendency, a moti-
vation to “do something about the health risk.”
NOTES
1. The findings on measures of persuasion (but not of cognitive
responses and negative affect) in Experiment 1 have been described by
Kuppens, De Wit, and Stroebe (1996) in the Dutch language in Gedrag &
Gezondheid.
2. A median split procedure was used in Experiments 1 and 2
mainly for reasons of nonhomogeneity of variance on the measures of
perceived vulnerability, showing a slight imbalance in the distribution
of participants across conditions. The cell n s are reported in Table 1.
3. An article by Bobko (1986) is of interest here. It is claimed that
traditional analyses of variance can produce spurious main effects and
result in decreased power to detect the interaction of interest. In this
article, theory-driven planned comparisons are proposed as a solution
to this problem. This reasoning seems particularly applicable to the
findings of Experiment 2, in which the sample size was rather small, in
addition to a somewhat unbalanced distribution of participants across
experimental conditions.
4. Experiment 3 does not contain cognitive responses of partici-
pants. We did include a thought-listing measure similar to Experiment
1. However, due to technical problems the thoughts listed were incom-
plete, rendering this measure inadequate.
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